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ABSTRACT: We investigate the efficiency and equity implications of a redistributive rule that takes into
account both local tax collection efforts and deviation of local incomes from respective targets under
alternative fiscal mechanisms. We show that, if the general budget constraint is binding, the proposed
transfer rule leads to higher fiscal discipline under fiscal decentralization (FD) than under centralized
redistribution. Although the centralized decision yields better income distribution than FD, FD also improves
income distribution unambiguously when equalization across regions is targeted explicitly. When localities
act strategically, the private sector’s utility weight enhances the disciplinary effect of decentralization.
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Introduction
Fiscal decentralization (FD) is an institutional mechanism whereby fiscal power and responsibilities
are transferred from the central government toward local governments. Following the seminal work of
Oates (1972), the literature on FD has been extensive, comprised of both empirical and theoretical
studies. A growing literature on the socio-economic consequences of FD has provided mixed evidence
on the merits of FD.1 Likewise, the recent strand of the empirical literature that investigates the
macroeconomic implications of FD is far from reaching a consensus.2 Moreover, the effectiveness of
FD in attaining the socio-economic objectives has been reported to depend on various structural
characteristics and institutional factors.3 The current article contributes to this literature by developing
an original model to explore the fiscal efficiency and welfare implications of a fiscal institutional
design defined by FD and a redistributive rule.
Central government transfers have constituted a major source of financing local fiscal activities.4
The need for transfers arises from both vertical and horizontal imbalances, the former of which are
common due to greater capacity of central governments in collecting revenue than local govern-
ments, while horizontal imbalances arise from the varying fiscal capacities across different regions
of a country. Aside from these capacity constraints, inadequate tax collection effort of local
governments, a form of moral hazard, also leads to local governments’ reliance on central govern-
ment transfers.
Because local governments benefit from their own spending but not directly from own tax
collection effort, inefficiencies may arise when externalities of local government actions are not
internalized effectively. In the absence of well-defined rules, favoritism toward political constituencies
may also lead to political business cycles, increased fiscal imbalances, macroeconomic instability and
inequality. The emphasis on FD in developmental policy agendas has therefore been on the rise, in
tandem with the increasingly recognized importance of accountability and transparency in achieving
fiscal discipline.5 Redistributive rules can improve welfare by reducing or eliminating vertical and
horizontal imbalances. If a redistribution mechanism is not well-designed, however, moral hazard and
common pool problems may be exacerbated.6
Against this background, a couple of recent studies investigate the welfare impact of FD in view of
specific redistributive schemes. Sanguinetti and Tomassi (2004) compare the rule-based versus
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discretionary fiscal transfers using a game theoretic framework where transfers are considered as
insurance against local shocks across regions under asymmetric information. Welfare comparisons
reveal that discretionary financing is more preferable in the event of large local shocks, while rule-
based transfers are preferred in case of a high degree of FD that increases the degree of common pool
problem.7 Stowhase and Traxler (2005) model fiscal competition where costs of tax enforcement are
shared across regions where, similar to the current article, tax effort (in their case the rate of auditing
local tax collection) becomes local government’s strategic tool. Their analysis reveals that the fiscal
equalization scheme, based on net revenue sharing, helps to internalize fiscal externalities. The authors
concede, however, that the feasibility of the redistributive mechanism they suggest to improve the
efficiency in tax collection is questionable in view of informational asymmetries.
Ma (1997) points out that a redistributive mechanism that takes both efficiency and equity criteria
into account is considered to be the most developed one, notwithstanding its information and
enforcement costs.8 The redistributive mechanism suggested in this article takes this into account
and hence differs from that of Stowhase and Traxler (2005) as we also consider the income
compensation, or equalization, besides the efficiency aspect. Local income compensation can be
viewed either with respect to some pre-defined local targets or some common national target. To
measure the degree of fiscal efficiency, or fiscal discipline, we focus on the effectiveness of local
governments in collecting local taxes.
This article investigates the fiscal disciplinary implications of such a redistributive rule under
alternative fiscal scenarios. Under the scenario of fiscal decentralization (FD), local governments
optimally choose their tax collection efforts given a preannounced redistributive rule that both
punishes a less-than-full tax-collection effort (measured by the deviation from the revenue collection
capacity, or some target revenue) and compensates for the deviation of local incomes from their
target.9 Two alternative scenarios can be considered under this scheme, depending on the nature of
interactions among the local governments. In the first scenario, we consider many small local
governments that do not act strategically (denoted simply by FD); while in the second, the number
of localities is relatively few and they act strategically, taking into account each others’ optimal action
(denoted by FDNash).10 Under an alternative scenario, the central government (CG) chooses optimally
the level of transfers without a preannounced redistribution rule.11
We compare the solutions of the respective problems (FD, FDNash and CG) for the assessment of
the relative effectiveness of the proposed fiscal institutional design, namely fiscal decentralization
combined with the redistributive rule.12 Due to the complexity of the expressions resulting from the
model’s solutions, simulations are used to evaluate the results comparatively. The basic model outlined
above is rich of extensions. Besides the benchmark case of full information, we analyze the case of
asymmetric information when either the poor or the rich region is hit by a shock that local govern-
ments observe but the central government does not. In addition, we investigate the effect of incorpor-
ating a convergence target into the redistributive rule. Finally, we investigate the implications of both
the benchmark and the rest of the scenarios for income distribution for i) fiscal efficiency; ii) welfare;
and iii) income distribution.
Simulations reveal that, provided that local governments face a general budget constraint, decentra-
lization leads to greater efficiency, measured by higher tax collection effort and lower size of redistribu-
tion, than under centralized decision making. The results remain robust in the case of informational
asymmetries between the central and local governments about the local shocks.13 When budget
constraint is not binding under decentralization, the findings are observed to be reversed however.14
This observation is supported by the panel evidence in Neyapti (2013), who shows that both balanced
budget and debt rules enhance the negative effect of fiscal decentralization on budget deficit.
In contrast with the pro-decentralization findings of the current model with regard to efficiency, we
observe that central decision making dominates decentralized decision making with regard to income
distribution. When the target of convergence across localities is considered along with the redistribu-
tive rule, however, redistribution under decentralized decision making also improves income distribu-
tion unambiguously, although not as much as under centralized decision making. Interestingly, and
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consistent with Bouton et al. (2008), improvements in income distribution under decentralization is
inversely related to the size of redistribution.
The rest of the article is organized as follows: In the next section, we present the basic features of
the model. The third section reports the redistributive outcomes of different fiscal schemes in a
comparative way. We then provide two main extensions to the base-line scenario and evaluate their
results. The final section provides the conclusions.
The Model
The current model focuses on the analysis of public sector behavior in a static framework, taking the
decisions of private sector as given. The economy consists of n local governments, redistribution
among which is made via the central government. The local governments take policy variables, such
as the tax rate (t) set by the central government, as given exogenously. For the sake of simplicity, tax is
assumed to be of one type: that on income. The income of each region is assumed to be exogenous.15
Taxes are collected by local governments that may exert varying levels of effort in tax collection.16
Each local government i (i = 1. . ..n) thus has an effective tax rate that is given by ti = tAi where Ai is
the tax collection effort (Ai ∊ [0,1]). The portion (1–c) of tax revenues is spent by the local
government, constituting part of its expenditures (Gi), where c is the proportion sent to the common
revenue pool.17 In addition, local governments spend what is transferred back to them (TRi) by the
central government according to the announced rule of redistribution. Local government spending is
the only form of government spending in a locality. Hence the government spending in region i is
given by:
Gi ¼ 1 cð ÞtiYi þ TRi
where Yi is the local income, which is commonly observed. For simplicity, localities are assumed to
differ only in their income levels that are known ex-ante. Alternatively, localities can be assumed to
use the same technology while they differ in their ex-ante known levels of capital and labor. The level
of private spending Ci is given by:
18
Ci ¼ 1 tið ÞYi:
The total size of the transfers (TR) by the central government is equal to the sum of revenues collected
in the common pool: TR = cΣtiYi, and other forms of financing do not exist. Given these basic features,
the local and central government problems are presented in the next two sections, respectively.
Local Governments’ Problem: The Case of Fiscal Decentralization
Under fiscal decentralization, we consider two alternative scenarios: i) no strategic interaction among
the local governments (LGs); ii) the Nash solution, where LGs act strategically but noncooperatively;
the two scenarios are denoted by FD and FDNash respectively. The FDNash scheme is relevant for the
case of a few or highly polarized LGs, each of which considers that others’ decisions affect his or her
own welfare significantly. The following sections report the solutions of FD and FDNash problems. In
both of the schemes, CG preannounces the redistributive rule whose parameters are chosen optimally
to correspond to the possible values of local tax collection effort (see Appendix 1); hence the
redistributive rule can be viewed as a reaction function.
No Strategic Interaction Among the LGs (FD)
The process of FD is defined as follows: each local government (LGs) maximizes the utility it obtains
from own jurisdiction, subject to the preannounced redistribution rule by the central government. In
the case of numerous localities, a common pool problem may arise since each LG internalizes the
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inefficiency from tax collection only partially. Inefficiency in tax collection of a given LG is punished,
but nonetheless shrinks the nationwide pool of transfers that may be used for income compensation for
all the regions. Noting that nonstrategically acting local governments do not consider the overall
budget balance as a constraint, the FD process is likely to result in general budget deficits.
Hence, each LG chooses its level of Ai, where 0 < Ai ≤ 1, which stands for the effectiveness in tax
collection; this way the LGi chooses the effective tax rate for locality i (Ait). For purposes of
tractability, we assume that the local government has a Cobb-Douglass type of utility (ULG), which
is defined over the local private and public consumption: Ci and Gi.
19 In a log-linear form, ULG of a
representative region i is given by:
Max
Ai
ULG ¼ α ln Ci þ β ln Gi ; where i ¼ 1 . . . n (1)
where α and β represent the relative weights of private and government spending in utility; hence they
add up to 1.20 Given the expressions of Ci and Gi, while increasing Ai increases the latter of these
terms, it decreases the former due to decreased disposable income.
LG solves the problem in Equation (1), subject to the redistribution rule, given in Equation (2), that
accounts for both the efficiency and equity objectives:21
TRi ¼ pt Yi Ai  1ð Þ þ m Yi  Yið Þ (2)
where Yi* is an exogenously set target of Yi.
22 p and m are the key institutional parameters that denote
the extent to which less than full tax collection effort (Ai–1) is punished
23 and income deviation from a
target is compensated, respectively. These parameters are chosen optimally by the CG (see Appendix
1) given the LG problem’s solution. The redistributive rule accounts for both efficiency and equity
objectives and, as such, is considered to follow the best practice.24
The sequence of the model’s solution is as follows:
1. The optimal values of p and m are found by the CG by solving the problem in Appendix 1. CG
announces the redistribution rule, which acts like a reaction function corresponding to the stream
of Ai values.
2. LG solves his own maximization problem by maximizing (1) subject to (2) to find the optimal
Ai.
3. The p and m values corresponding to the optimal Ai’s are used to determine the level of TRi.
The solution of the LG problem can be written in terms of the optimum effort (A0):25
Aoi ¼
αmðY i  YiÞ þ Yiðβ  βcþ pðtαþ βÞÞ
tYiðαþ βÞ  ð1 cþ pÞ : (3)





TRi ¼ mð1þ αpÞY i 
ðc 1Þðmþ ptÞαþ ðc 1 pÞðmþ pðt  1ÞÞβ
ðc 1 pÞðαþ βÞ Yi: (4)
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Nash Solution to the LG Problem (FDNash)
In case of a small number of LGs, each LG may act strategically, viewing that its transfers result from
a common pool of revenues that is partially determined by the efforts of the rest of the LGs. Hence,
each LG solves the optimization problem stated in Equations (1) and (2) with an additional constraint:




AiYi for i ¼ 1 . . . :n: (5)
Given the redistributive rule (2), the optimal level of effort by each LGi thus become dependent on










½ptYjðAj  1Þ þ mðY j  YjÞ: (6)
The sequence of the model solution for FDNash only differs from FD in step 2, which becomes (2): LG
acts strategically and chooses his tax effort by maximizing (1) subject to Equations (2) and (5). Since
Equations (2) and (5) are contained in Equation (6), the FDNash problem is defined as the maximization
of Equation (1) subject to Equation (6). The solution yields LGi’s reaction function:
Aoi ¼
ðp cÞαtAjYj þ βYi  αptYj þ mαðY j  YjÞ
ðβ þ αÞtYi :
Since each region acts in the same manner, the Nash equilibrium for Aoi (i = 1,2)
26 is given by (Appendix
2):
AoNashi ¼
ððp cÞαÞðβYj  αptYi þ mαðY i  YiÞÞ þ αþ βð ÞðβYi  αptYj þ mαðY j  YjÞÞ
ððβ þ αÞ2  ððp cÞαÞ2ÞtYi
: (7)
The Central Government’s Problem
As alternative to the FD problem, the central government (CG) is assumed to choose optimally the
level of transfers by maximizing the overall welfare (UCG); in the context of the current problem,
welfare is the sum of the utilities of all localities. CG is assumed to take LGs’ efforts (Ai’s) given.
27
The main constraint is that total transfers are equal to the common pool of revenues, as it is in the case






α ln Ci þ β ln Gi½  (8)
subject to Equation (5). The solution yields (see Appendix 3):
TRi ¼ t=nð Þ
Xn
i¼1
AiYið Þ  1 cð ÞtAiYi (9)
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which states trivially that the optimum redistribution implies equal local government spending in each
locality (Gi =(1– c)t AiYi + TRi).
28 This result is consistent with the standard assumption of policy
uniformity under centralization.
Implications
In order to derive the policy implications regarding the three fiscal schemes outlined above, we
perform comparative static analysis. The signs of the partial derivatives that are observed explicitly
are all in the expected directions: in the case of CG’s optimization, c, t, Ai and Yi all have positive
effects on total transfers. Under FD, the effect of the deviation of income from target on Ai and TRi are
negative and positive, respectively. In addition, in the FDNash problem, efforts of localities are
positively correlated. Due to the complexity of the expressions, explicit signs for the rest of the partial
derivatives could not be obtained, however. We therefore perform a simulation analysis in order to
obtain the signs of the remaining partials, using a set of feasible values for the model parameters and
calibrating the variables. The results of all the comparative-statics, those that are explicit and those that
are obtained based on the simulations, are reported in Appendix 3 and Table A1. The simulations also
allow us to obtain the rankings of the alternative FD and the CG problems with regard to fiscal
efficiency.
The following are the range of values for the model parameters29 as well as for the exogenously
given values of Yi and Y i . For tractability, we assume that there are two LGi’s (i = 1,2) the first of
which is poor region and the second is rich. The assumption of two local governments is kept through
all scenarios below:
α ¼ 0:7; β ¼ 0:3; c ¼ 0:1; t 0:1; 0:5½ ; Ai 0; 1ð ;
Y1 100; 500½ ; Y1 1:01ð ÞY1; 1:1ð ÞY1½ ;
Y2 1;000; 30;000½ ; Y2 1:01ð ÞY2; 1:1ð ÞY2½ :
The selections of the ranges of values for α and β can be justified on the grounds of the relative
shares of state and private sectors, respectively. c is chosen to be 0.1 to account for the case of high
degree of revenue decentralization. Simulations also take into account the constraint that the total of
targeted level of aggregate output exceeds the total of its actual level.30 The policy parameters p and m
are obtained as the optimal solutions to an alternative CG problem reported in Appendix 1, where CG
chooses them to maximize the aggregate utility given the general budget constraint. Recalling that LGs
optimally select their tax effort given the redistributive rule, simulations are performed by matching
the optimal Ai’s of the LG problem with the feed values that are used to calculate the optimal set of p
and m pairs.31 As a result, the optimal Ai pairs for the two localities, and the implied TRi’s, are
simulated (using Matlab) for the FD and FDNash procedures. The resulting simulation data that are
comprised of the optimal p and m pairs, which correspond to the matching optimal and feed Ai’s and
range between 0 and 1, are 19355 and 5507 for the FD and FDNash procedures, respectively.32
In order to compare the level of transfers across the three fiscal regimes for each optimal p and m
pairs, we use the same set of optimal Ai pairs to calculate the optimal TRi’s for the CG problem. Next,
to compare the implied levels of fiscal discipline measured by the effort level under the FD and CG
procedures, we take the optimal TRi’s simulated for the two alternative FD regimes and find the
implied sum of Ai’ s under the CG regime.
Based on the signs of the partial derivatives reported in Table A1, the following remarks can be
made. Under FDNash, an increase in the tax rate (t) leads to an increased competition among the LGs
over a greater size of redistribution (to compensate for the lower utility derived from private
consumption), which has a positive effect on the level of tax effort. In this case, the redistribution
rule seems to generate incentives compatible with the main fiscal policy instrument, t, as the
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downward portion of the Laffer curve seems to be eliminated. Under FD, however, the effect of t on
the tax effort is indeterminate.
Increasing the central government’s share in local tax revenues (c) also leads to greater tax effort
and transfers under FDNash because expectation of a greater common pool leads each LG to increase its
tax effort. The reverse occurs under FD, however, where an increase in c implies lower tax effort and
transfers; when LGs behave nonstrategically, they try to compensate for the utility loss arising from a
decrease in Gi, which decreases in c, by increasing the utility from private consumption that is
negatively related with the effort level.
Remark 1: Both increasing the tax rate (t) and the extent of centralization of the tax revenues (c) leads to
an increase in fiscal discipline and the size of transfers under FDNash.
The higher the weight on public consumption in the utility function (β) the lower is the tax effort
and redistribution under FDNash. This is because local governments can afford to forego some transfers
via increased punishment in return of additional utility received from private consumption, which is
negatively related to the optimal tax effort. This result arises since each LG acts in consideration of a
smaller common pool of revenues given that (∂Ai / ∂Aj) > 0.
33 When LGs do not act strategically,
however, this effect is not observed: an increase in β leads to increased effort in order to generate more
spending for themselves, which also results in a larger common pool.
The higher the weight on private spending in the utility function (α), the higher is the tax effort
under FDNash, which negatively affects the after tax income that in turn leads to lower private
spending. This seemingly counterintuitive result can be explained by the income effect of an increase
in α exceeding the substitution effect. Income effect arises from increasing the effort, because LG can
obtain the same utility with a lower private income than before. Meanwhile, the increase in the effort
increases LG’s utility through the public spending channel as transfers increase due to reduced
punishment. Substitution effect, on the other hand, leads to a decrease in the LG’s effort so as to
increase private consumption in order to take advantage of its increased weight in utility. This
complementarity between the size of the private sector and increased fiscal discipline under FD can
be viewed as a challenge to Tanzi (2000) who argues FD to be a substitute for privatization. In case of
FD without strategic behavior, the effects of α on both tax effort and transfers are indeterminate.
Remark 2: When local governments act strategically, the proposed redistributive mechanism leads to
greater fiscal discipline under fiscal decentralization, the greater the weight of private spending in the
economy.
The positive effect of the punishment parameter (p) has the expected positive effect on the level of
effort under both FD and FDNash. Transfers to the poor region are similarly affected under FD,
although the effect of p on transfers is indeterminate under FDNash. The effect of the income
compensation parameter (m) on tax effort is negative under both FD and FDNash. Hence, only the
punishment component of the redistributive mechanism works as a fiscal disciplining device, not the
income compensation component. In addition, while the sum of transfers decreases in m under FDNash,
it increases in m under FD; that is, the loss in tax collection efficiency is not sufficient to offset the size
of redistribution under FD. Model simulations indicate that, on average, the punishment of fiscal
imprudence accounts for about 40 percent of the equalization transfers.34 Under FDNash, however, the
budget is balanced given the way the problem is set up.
Proposition: Under FD, income compensation, or the deviation of income from the target, reduces the
incentive for tax collection (moral hazard).
Proof: Given @A@m ¼
αðY i YiÞ
tYið1cþpÞ , because α > 0 ;Y

i >Yi ; and c < 0.1, this sign of the partial is negative.
Remark 3: Income compensation causes moral hazard under FDNash as well.
To investigate the fiscal disciplinary effects of the alternative fiscal schemes, we next compare the
implied level of total tax efforts and size of transfers. Based on a common set of values of p and m,
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which corresponds to the same set of Ai’s for the FD
Nash and CG models,35 simulations yield the




















These results indicate that FD leads to larger total tax effort and smaller size of redistribution than CG,
and under FDNash, where LGs face a balanced budget constraint (Equation 5). The results are reversed,
however, in case budget deficits are allowed under FD. This is a straightforward implication of the
common pool problem: FD reduces fiscal discipline when externalities are not internalized fully;
hence, FDNash yields higher fiscal discipline than FD when general government budget deficits are
allowed. In case a general budget constraint is not imposed, both the size of redistribution is greater
and tax effort is lower under FD than under FDNash (and CG). This result is one of the main
contributions of the current formal framework to the literature.
Remark 4: When a general budget constraint is imposed, FD leads to greater fiscal discipline than both
FDNash and CG in terms of higher tax collection effort.
Hence, given the above redistributive rule, centralization (CG) is not the first best if budget constraint
is imposed effectively. Although evidence on the implementation of the above type of redistribute rule
is too rare to carry out an empirical test of these findings, recent evidence on the significant role of
balanced budget rules on the fiscal disciplinary effect of FD provides strong support for this result (see,
Neyapti 2013).
Extensions
This section investigates two extensions of the above benchmark scenario of full information. The first
part reports the effects of choosing equal income targets across localities in the redistributive rule. The
second part reports the effects of local income shocks that the CG observes indirectly, through the
remitted revenues. The third part reports the equity impact of redistribution under all fiscal scenarios
and informational assumptions.
Equalization of Incomes Across Localities
Eliminating horizontal imbalances is one of the main objectives of redistribution. Hence, this section
focuses the implications of the FD, FDNash, and CG schemes in case target incomes of different
localities are chosen to be the same. This extension also addresses the question of whether the above
results are an artifact of a particular set of income levels.
To examine this case, we choose the levels of incomes to be closer in range and income targets
across localities to be the same:
t 0:1; 0:5½ ; Y1 100; 1;000½ ; Y2 2;000; 10;000½ ; Y i  1:01ð ÞY2; 1:1ð ÞY2½ :
The corresponding set of (positive) p and m values that produce feasible data points (Ai values ranging
between zero and one) are 39030 for the case of FD. As noted earlier, these set of simulations also
indicate greater total tax effort (and smaller size of redistribution) under FD as compared to the CG
problem, when the LGs face the general budget constraint. As in the former case, FDNash and CG
problems produce the same set outcomes due to the common budget-balance constraint, implying that
the strategic behavior of local governments competing for a common pool produces inferior fiscal
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results (in terms of discipline), as compared to nonstrategic ones, in case the concern for equity is
integrated into fiscal policy.
Comparative statics of the both CG and FD problems based on the above range of parameter values
differ from the formerly reported ones in the following ways. First, the former ambiguous effects of
both t and α on both the level of tax effort and the size of transfers turn negative. This indicates that
when the redistributive rule is adopted along with an equalization target, increasing taxes have a
negative effect on fiscal discipline under FD, as viewed on the right side of the Laffer curve. Second, p
has a negative effect on TR in case of FD. These results are in contrast with the findings under FDNash,
the results for which are the same as for CG due to the common budget constraint. The rest of the
comparative statics yields the same signs as before, which reinforces the validity of our findings.
Hence,
Remark 5: Adoption of an equalization target along with the proposed redistributive rule renders tax
increases an ineffective tool of fiscal discipline.
In a study of German fiscal system, Von Hagen and Hepp (2000) suggest that equalization across
localities leads to adverse incentives for tax collection. Under the equalization target, our model
provides support for the Von Hagen and Hepp argument the higher the utility weight on the private
spending. Our findings indicate that the adoption of the fiscal rule proposed in this article may also
lead to such adverse incentives provided that budget constraint is not binding.
Shocks and Asymmetric Information
So far, the model assumed that there is no uncertainty regarding the realizations of local incomes. To
make the model more realistic, we consider a case where idiosyncratic shocks hitting local economies
are observed perfectly by the local governments, but not by the central government. This conforms
with the basic philosophy of decentralization since, as Sanguinetti and Tomassi state, “. . . the whole
debate over the virtues of decentralization would be a non-issue if asymmetric information was not
important, since in that case a centralized system would dominate all alternative arrangements” (153).
CG receives the portion of local taxes: [(ctAiYi)(1+εi)] without observing the level of the shock: εi,.
Hence, CG is not able to distinguish whether the change in the tax collection is due to a change in the
local tax effort or to a shock to the income level, hence it follows the LG’s report of Yi and Ai, which
may diverge from the actualization of those variables.37 Considering that (1+εi) may originate from














While each LG observes its own shock, it also conjectures that the CG will apply the above
redistributive rule. As a result of this asymmetry, despite the fact that both CG and FDNash face the
budget constraint38, transfers and the implied effort levels differ between these two fiscal schemes
also, which is contrary to the former set up where all governments had full information.
Simulations of the model are carried out assuming that the shock term follows a normal
distribution. Separate simulations are performed for the set of positive and negative shocks that
are both of the magnitude of within 50 percent of the income level, that is ε1 2 (–0.5; 0.5)Y1. The
positive or negative shocks may hit either the poor or rich localities, under which the results do not
differ. One may consider, however, that shocks to the poor locality are more likely to occur since
poor regions are more often than not associated with the traditional sector that is prone to weather
conditions.39
Simulations reveal that both FD and FDNash generate better outcomes than CG under asymmetric
shocks.40 These findings can be summarized as follows:

























These findings are robust across the sign of the shocks and the size of locality; introduction of the
equal income targets (convergence) also does not affect the result. The results confirm the findings
obtained under the assumption of no shocks, with the additional information regarding the case of
FDNash that can now be obtained as distinct from the case of CG.
Income Distribution Effects of Transfers: Alternative Fiscal Schemes
To evaluate the income distribution effects of the alternative fiscal schemes, we compare the pre-
transfer income ratios of the localities with those after redistribution takes place. When (Y1/Y2)/[(Y1
+TR1)/(Y2+TR2)] is less than 1 (given that locality 1 is the lower income locality), redistribution is said
to improve income distribution.
Simulations indicate that CG problem always yields better income distribution than the two FD
regimes (except under full information where CG and FDNash are not distinguished from each other).
Moreover, it is observed that income distribution may even worsen under FD or FDNash unless the
equalization objective is imposed via equal income target ranges in the redistributive rule. Under the
equalization scenario, however, even though income distribution improves under all the fiscal scenar-
ios, centralized redistribution leads to greater equality than both of the FD regimes. Hence, the
proposed redistributive rule works as an insurance against local shocks—by not-worsening income
distribution in case of a negative shock, only when the rule is combined with the objective of
equalization (or convergence) across localities.
Remark 6: Welfare gains vary under alternative fiscal institutional schemes: while CG delivers higher
equity than FD (and FDNash), FD is superior with regard to the efficiency criterion if budget constraint is
binding. In the absence of balanced budget, decentralization leads to welfare losses (both in terms of
efficiency and equity).
Bouton et al. (2008) demonstrate theoretically and empirically that income distribution under FD
worsens in vertical imbalances, or the size of transfers. Our findings show, however, that when the
redistributive rule involves the target of convergence among local incomes, redistribution under both
FD and FDNash improves income distribution, though not as much as under CG, while CG has a
greater size of transfers.
Conclusions
This article presents a model to analyze the efficiency and equity implications of fiscal decentraliza-
tion. Fiscal decentralization is defined as the local governments’ decision on their tax collection effort
given the redistributive rule announced and implemented by the central government. Local govern-
ments may or may not act strategically, providing two alternative scenarios of fiscal decentralization.
The transfer mechanism entails both income compensation and punishment of insufficient tax collec-
tion effort.
The main policy implications of the proposed fiscal institutional design are that:
i. FD has a fiscal disciplining effect because, when the budget constraint is binding, it yields
greater efficiency (both higher total tax collection effort and lower size of redistribution) than
in the case of the CG problem; when local governments do not face a budget constraint,
however, CG is more efficient.
ii. The extent of privatization of the economy improves the fiscal disciplining role of FD only
when local governments act strategically (FDNash).
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iii. Redistribution under CG leads to better income distribution than both FD and FDNash, indicating
a trade-off between the objectives of efficiency and equity. Furthermore, an increase in the tax
rate is observed to increase both the size of transfers and the level of tax effort in case of FDNash.
A dynamic extension of the current model explores the capital accumulation and welfare implica-
tions under FD facing the redistributive rule presented here (Bulut-Cevik and Neyapti 2014). Taking
the balanced budget constraint binding, the authors show that FD is associated with higher steady-state
level of fiscal efficiency the larger the parameters of the redistributive rule, which is consistent with the
findings of the static model.
Notes
1. See, for example, Bardhan and Mookherjee (1998), Panizza (1999), Barrett (2000), Blanchard and Shleifer
(2000), Dethier (2000), Hope (2000), Lin and Liu (2000), Norris et al. (2000), de Mello (2000 and 2004), Tanzi
(2000), Treisman (2000), Von Braun and Grote (2000), Eaton (2001), de Mello and Barenstein (2001), Wasylenko
(2001), Feltenstein and Iwata (2002), and Fisman and Gatti (2002). A review of those findings may be found in
Neyapti (2010), among others.
2. Davoodi and Zou (1998) report a negative relationship between FD and growth in less developed
countries; Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2006) show a mixed evidence on this relationship and Thiessen
(2003) argues that only moderate FD leads to growth. By contast, Jalil et al. (2014) suggest a strong
statistically significant positive relation between FD and economic growth in most provinces in China. King
and Ma (2001) and Neyapti (2004) both show a negative relationship between revenue decentralization and
inflation. Jin and Zou (2002) show that government size is positively related with expenditure decentralization
and negatively related with revenue decentralization. Neyapti (2006) shows that revenue decentralization leads
to better income distribution the higher is governance. Kappeler and Välilä (2008) argue that FD boosts public
investment productivity. Neyapti (2010) shows that FD is significantly associated with lower budget deficits in
largely populated countries.
3. See, for example, Oates (1999); de Mello (2000); Tanzi (2000); Drummond and Masor (2003); Smoke et al.
(2006); Bouton et al. (2008); and Neyapti (2004, 2006, 2010).
4. Central governments have both wider available tax bases and better tax collection capacity than local
governments. Although many developed countries have relatively low vertical imbalances, central government
transfers still constitute 50 percent to 70 percent of local government budgets. In countries like Peru, Portugal and
Iran this ratio has been more than 90 percent.
5. See IMF 2009 for a recent survey of the experience with fiscal rules around the world. Neyapti (2013)
demonstrates empirically that fiscal disciplinary effects of fiscal decentralization and rules reinforces each other.
6. Unlike the existing studies, the problem addressed in the current framework is not one of optimal taxation,
which emphasizes equalization of marginal cost of taxation across different tax sources. Boadway et al. (2003), for
example, examine the relationship between FD and equalization via redistribution in optimal taxation framework,
with a focus on migration across regions.
7. Sanguinetti and Tomassi (2004) is not directly comparable to the current one as the current article considers
a redistributive rule and the former considers that taxes are set by both local and federal governments.
8. Ma (1997) reports four classifications of fiscal transfer systems that focus on either efficiency or equity
objectives or both. In the first, transfers are made on the basis of both equalization of fiscal capacities and
expenditure needs across regions. The second method only considers equalization of fiscal capacities; the third
only considers equalizing expenditure needs, measured by a weighted average of various socioeconomic and
demographic indicators. A final classification of fiscal transfer methods entails the equalization of transfers only
on the per capita basis.
9. CG announces the redistributive rule, and decides the level of rule parameters optimally. One may consider
punishment as a second type of tax that the central government imposes on local governments.
10. We do not consider a case of collusion among the localities which would, in the limit, collapse to the
problem of central government.
11. Boadway et al. (2003) and Stowhase and Traxler (2005) also compare central and local government
decision making.
12. Both Boadway et al. (2003) and Stowhase and Traxler (2005) similarly compare central and local
government decision making.
13. In the absence of informational asymmetries, simulations do not allow a ranking between the FDNash and
CG problems with respect to the total effort and the size of redistribution.
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14. Modifying the current model to explicitly incorporate the burden of spending in the FD problem is an
interesting extension, although it adds further the current complexity of the model and makes the solution
intractable. The punishment component of the redistributive rule employed here serves similar purpose, however.
15. We assume that only the levels of productive factors vary across regions. A natural extension of this model
is to introduce heterogeneity across regions in terms of the relative endowments sizes, suggesting different types
of production across regions.
16. While income-tax is generally centrally collected, unless perhaps in federal systems, the local government’s
optimization of tax collection effort can be justified on a couple of grounds: first, by helping monitor the economic
activity subject to tax collection, local governments can be rewarded via some preannounced incentive mechan-
isms, as this model proposes. Second, local government’s effort to collect income tax limits unrecorded economic
activity and tax evasion, which helps improve local tax collection efficiency in general.
17. Aslim and Neyapti (2013) analyze endogenous determination of FD, which is beyond the scope of the
current study.
18. For the economy as a whole, total transfers are equal to common pool of revenues, leading one to obtain:
ΣYi = Σ(Ci+Gi). For a given locality, Ci+G i = Yi + “net transfers,” where “net transfers” are given by (TRi – ctiYi).
19. The assumed concavity of the utility function is to satisfy the necessary condition for the existence of a
solution; sufficiency conditions are also met.
20. This formulation allows for a large spectrum of the degree of benevolence for local governments, indicated
by relative weights.
21. Boadway and Shah (2007) define the first part of this expression as deviation from average effort; for
purposes of model tractability, we instead compare local effort with full tax collection capacity. Boadway and
Shah (2007) note that implementation of these rules is prone to various inefficiencies even in developed countries.
22. Yi* may be some fixed growth rate over the previous realization of Yi. Simulations are run assuming that Yi
≤Yi*. In one of the extensions provided below, Yi*’s will be taken to be the same across localities.
23. To measure the target level of tax collection, regions with similar income levels can be taken into account
to calculate a benchmark level of tax revenue.
24. See also Ma (1997).
25. The game between CG and LGs is similar to the leader-follower type game and the game among the LGs is
similar to the simultaneous quantity (Cournot) competition game. The simulations are conducted such that the
interaction between LGs and the CG is achieved by matching the optimal Ai’s resulting from the LG problem with
those used as the feed values in the redistributive rule of the CG.
26. Throughout the article n = 2 is assumed for simplicity.
27. As standard in simultaneous game analyses, we compare the optimal solutions of the CG with those of FD
or FDNash. Hence, we use the values of Ai’s that are optimally selected ones under the LG problem across both
fiscal schemes. Likewise, the same set of TRs is used to compare the implied effort levels for case of CG with
those of FD or FDNash.
28. It is common that CGs use the common pool toward meeting their own constituencies’ demands and for
political survival rather than for improving income distribution. Given the already complex nature of the problem
at hand, however, we refrain from political economy aspects of redistribution.
29. Based on the marginal income and effective (labor and capital) tax calculations of Easterly and Rebelo
(1993), Mendoza et al. (1994), and Wolff (2005), the tax rate can be considered to be 0.1 < t < 0.5.
30. The income levels can be considered to be in per capita dollar terms.
31. Note that the optimal p and m are chosen for a range of feed values of Ai (see Appendix 1).
32. The procedure to obtain the simulation data is as follows. First, for the set of feasible A1, A2, Y1 and Y2
values, the corresponding optimal p and m values are calculated from the CG problem. Then, the level of optimal
tax effort is calculated (simulated for the feasible ranges of the rest of the parameter values in the model) in the LG
problem. For the purpose of comparison, we then select the matching sets of optimal and feed A10 and A20 values
found in the LG and the CG problems. In the matching process, the difference between optimal and calculated tax
effort is limited by a tolerance number.
33. The condition is p >c, which is met in the simulations. While increasing own tax collection effort increases
the transfers received by a region, increased tax collection effort of the other region leads to reduced transfers.
34. This can be compared to the Robin Hood tax reported in Shah (in Boadway and Shah 2007): in
Switzerland 41 percent of the financing of equalization comes from the rich.
35. The equality between FDNash and CG arises from the fact that the budget constraint is common in the two
problems.
36. A sample of simulations can be requested from the authors.
37. This is unlike the full or no insurance cases in Sanguinetti and Tomassi (2004).
38. Besfamille and Lockwood (2008) argue that the efficiency gains (in terms of higher effort) obtained
through hard budget constraints under FD may be counter balanced by the efficiency losses in terms of
underinvestment.
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39. When the shock hits the poor locality, the usable number of observations obtained for the FD and FDNash
problems are 2215 and 6683 for the case of positive shock, and 26733 and 33821 for the case of negative shock,
respectively. Under the scenario of equalization, the respective data points are 39030, 27158, 38891, and 4261.
40. Because the source of shocks is not directly observed by the government, the optimal choices of the CG
and FDNash are different from each other.
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Appendix 1
Optimal Choice of p and m
For the LG problem, it is essential to know how the central government will redistribute a common
pool of revenues; i.e., the set of punishment and equalization parameters corresponding to each pair
(since n = 2) of potential effort levels pertaining to the localities. Hence, parameters p and m are
determined optimally by the CG as a solution to the problem, where CG maximizes the sum of utilities
of all localities subject to the condition that the total pool of revenues is equal to the total transfers that













ðptYiðAi  1Þ þ mðY i  YiÞÞ:
Optimal values of p and m are obtained as the solution to the above problem, given that the effort of
each locality ranges between zero and one. The values of TR simulated for this problem are the same
as the one obtained under the CG problem reported earlier due to the left-hand side of the constraint.
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Appendix 2
Solutions of the CG and LG Problems
A2.1 Finding Optimal p and m











ðptYiðAi  1Þ þ mðY i  YiÞÞÞ (i)
where L denotes the Lagrangean and μ is the Lagrange multiplier, yielding unique solutions for p and m.
A2.2 The LG Problem (Nonstrategic Case: FD)
Substituting the transfer constraint (Equation 2) into the objective function (Equation 1) yields:
L ¼ α ln ð1 tAiÞYið Þ þ β ln ð1 cÞtAiYi þ ptYiðAi  1Þ þ mðY i  YiÞ
 
(ii)
The first order condition obtained from the solution of the above Lagrangean with respect to Ai, gives
optimal tax effort as in Equation (3).
A2.3 The LG Problem (Strategic Case: FDNash)
From the constraint of the FDNash problem (Equation 5), Ai can be written in terms of the other agents’
tax effort (Aj). Because each LG assumes that the others select their optimal efforts in the same fashion,
j’s reaction function is also written in terms of Ai and its substitution in (6) results in Equation (7).
A2.4 The CG Problem
Using Equation (5):
TRj ¼ ctðA1Y1 þ A2Y2Þ  TRi; i  j:
The Lagrange of this maximization problem for each locality becomes:
L ¼ α ln ð1 tA1ÞY1ð Þ þ α ln ð1 tA2ÞY2ð Þ þ β ln ð1 cÞtAiYi þ TRið Þ
þ β ln ð1 cÞtAjYj þ ctðA1Y1 þ A2Y2Þ  TRi
 
which yields the following first order condition with respect toTRi :
TRi ¼ ctAiYi þ tAjYj  tAiYi2 :
Appendix 3
Comparative Statics
Comparative statics for the unambiguous results (for i,j =1,2; 1 is the poor region)
FD Problem : @Ai=@ðY i  YiÞ < 0; @TRi=@ðY i  YiÞ > 0
FD-NashProblem : @Aoi =@A
0
j > 0; if p > c
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CG Problem : @TR=@c>0; @TR=@n>0; @TR=@t>0; @TR=@Ai>0; TR=@ >0:
Simulation of the ambiguous comparative statics results – for the LG problem:
Nash Solution:











j>0ðfor p>cÞ; @Aoi =@ðY i  YiÞ<0;
@TRi=@Ai>0; @TRi=@Aj<0; @TR=@Ai<0:
@TR=@α>0; @TR=@β<0; @TR=@c>0; @TR=@t>0; @TR=@m<0; @TR=@p>0; @TR=@ðY i  YiÞ>0:
The same results are obtained for individual transfers: TRi, except for ∂TR2/∂p which is
indeterminate.
Non-Strategic Solution:
@Aoi =@α ¼ ?; @Aoi =@β ¼ ?; @Aoi =@p >0; @Aoi =@m<0; @Aoi =@c<0; @Aoi =@t ¼ ?;
@TR=@α ¼ ?; @TR=@β ¼ ?; @TR=@c<0; @TR=@t ¼ ?; @TR=@m>0; @TR=@p>0;
@TRi=@Ai>0; @TR=@ðY i  YiÞ>0
The same results are obtained for individual transfers: TRi
These results are summarized in Table A1 (for I = 1,2).
Table A1. Comparative statics of TR, TRi, and Ai





A1 + – + – + + na + –
A2 + – + – + + + na –
TR1 + – + – + + + – +
TR2 + – + – ? + – + +
TR + – + – + + – – +
Non–Strategic Solution:
A1 ? ? – – + ? na na –
A2 ? ? – – + ? na na –
TR1 ? ? – + + ? + + +
TR2 ? ? – + + ? + + +
TR ? ? – + + ? + + +
CG PROBLEM:
TR na na + na na + + + na
TR1 na na + na na na na na na
TR2 na na + na na na na na na
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